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The Soviet Union in its time was a major 
player in international development aid, 
and indeed, the Cold War may be cast as a 
competition between differing models of 
development, one capitalist, one socialist. 
When the Soviet Union was dissolved in 
1991, the tables were turned and Russia, 
once the core of a Soviet empire, was 
made subject to development initiatives 
just as was the developing world, aka the 
‘global South’. However, in this case, the 
‘global North’ shifted to assume the 
identity of ‘the West’, and a new 
terminology of ‘transitioning economy’ 
was contrived in order to avoid the 
awkwardness of referring to Russia and 
other Eastern European countries as 
‘developing economies’ (Wedel 1998) – 
this was, after all, the ‘second world’ and 
not the third, and the Soviet Union’s economy was, in fact, developed (just according to the wrong model, so to 
speak). The net effect of being so targeted was the same nevertheless, and Russians themselves knew it – it was not 
uncommon in the 1990s to hear Russians remark ironically, ‘We are not starving Africans!’ 
A new concept 
Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, Russia was obliged to play the role of quintessential eastern recipient of 
Western aid. But in 2007, Russia officially signalled its intention to reverse the directionality of aid once again by 
issuing, via the Ministry of Finance, a ‘Concept on 
Russia’s Participation in International Development 
Assistance’,1 and thereafter began to participate actively in 
the global arena of international aid donorship. According 
to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (which 
references a statement made by Russia’s Finance Minister 
Aleksei Kudrin in 2010), Russia spent approximately $200 
million on official development assistance in 2008.2 
According to the Financial Tracking Service, Russia’s 
expenditures on humanitarian aid in 2010 totalled more 
than $34 million, about a third of which went to Haiti in 
response to the January 2010 earthquake.3 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Donors Forum is a highly professionalized Russian NGO whose purpose is to enhance 
the effectiveness of organized grant-making and thereby support the development of a democratic 
civil society in Russia.	  
Fig. 2. Pierre-Louis Ronny receives medical attention from a Russian search 
and rescue team after being rescued from under the rubble of a building in 
downtown Port-au-Prince a week after the January 2010 earthquake.	  
The impetus for this formalization of a ‘concept’ on development assistance can be traced to Russia’s presidency of 
the G8 in 2006, and the summit that was held in St Petersburg in July of that year; in an article in Parlamentskaia 
Gazeta following the summit, a reporter commented, ‘Russia is currently the only G8 country that has not worked out 
a strategy for activity in the sphere of international development assistance.’4 Less than a year later, it had such a 
strategy – at least on paper. The message is pretty clear: Russia is resisting its latter subject placement in the global 
political economy, refusing to play the role of non-reciprocating aid recipient, and insisting on being taken as a 
legitimate player in the aid game. A key question is what sort of impact Russia’s changing subjectivity might have on 
development discourse and practice. 
I’m working with a fairly simple argument here, namely that persistent assumptions about the directionality of aid 
flows are reflected in development discourse and practice, with the ‘global North’ privileged as a consummate donor 
and the ‘global South’ inversely cast as a consummate recipient. The failure to break away from unsatisfactory 
shorthand labels such as ‘global North’ and ‘global South’ and ‘the West’ and ‘the Third World’ is symptomatic of 
these persistent assumptions, as is the fact that South-South and East-East partnerships are treated as titillating 
novelties (ominous or valorous, depending on one’s orientation). I am further arguing that these assumptions about 
North-South directionality are more fully exposed by Russia’s emergence as a donor of aid (which could also be said 
about India’s or China’s emergence). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, those assumptions are both challenged 
and affirmed by Russia’s participation in international development assistance. I will come back to this point 
presently. 
Along with the master narrative of North-South aid flows, there are also the assumptions about West-East aid flows 
that came into play with the changes after 1989, but this is a secondary dyad in development circles (and indeed it 
seems unlikely that the phrases ‘hemispheric West’ and ‘hemispheric East’ will ever catch on). A subsidiary argument 
here is that development discourse is compartmentalized: one the one hand, there is the discourse about the North 
developing the South, but on the other hand and separate from this, there is the discourse about the West developing 
the East. This is a contrived separation that is not helpful – the historical configuration of each is different, but the 
issues are essentially the same. I am seeking ways to bring these extremely artificial constructions together into one 
discursive universe, to force them into dialogue with one another, because I think this will reveal some significant 
patterns that are otherwise not as readily apparent. 
    	  
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relevance of ‘The Gift’ 
One conceptual lens through which some insight might be gained is that of Mauss’s understanding of the gift (Mauss 
2002). Mauss played with the idea that a gift implies obligations and opens up a social relation, noting that if the 
obligations are not properly observed, then the social relation becomes distorted – and one of the examples he cited 
was ‘almsgiving’, or charity. As Jonathan Benthall has suggested in these pages, development aid ‘is in fact charity by 
another name’, and mere avoidance of the word ‘charity’ does not mean the demeaning relationship inherent in one-
way flows of development aid is avoided (Benthall 2001: 2). In the words of Mauss, ‘Charity is still wounding for him 
Fig. 3. Vladimir Putin addresses a news briefing at the 
2006 G8 Summit hosted by Russia in St Petersburg.	  
Fig. 4. President Hu Jintao of China, then-President Vladimir Putin of Russia, 
and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India held a tripartite meeting during the 
2006 G8 summit in St Petersburg. 
who has accepted it, and the whole tendency of our morality is to strive to do away with the unconscious and injurious 
patronage of the rich almsgiver’ (Mauss 2002: 83). 
Anthropologists have tended to limit their deployment of gift theory to analysis of small-scale societies and face-to-
face social contexts, less often applying it to the analysis of charity on a larger scale, such as in the work of 
international NGOs, or in international development aid (besides Benthall 2001, see for example Bowie 1998 and 
Douglas 2000). However, gift theory is being picked up by development theorists outside anthropology in disciplines 
such as international relations (Hattori 2003) and geography (Mawdsley n.d.) as a useful tool for unpacking the 
relations inherent in international development aid. One reason it is so useful in this context is because the ‘charitable 
impulse’, that something which makes people want to ‘do good’ by giving, also compels corporate entities such as 
NGOs and government aid agencies to couch their actions within the language of such altruistic giving (regardless of 
how underlying motives might be more cynically understood). 
It could be argued that charity – or development aid – becomes wounding precisely in those circumstances when it is 
framed as a free gift with no return expected (possibly implying the recipient is incapable of return), rather than as a 
Maussian gift that would imply ongoing mutual obligations. Moreover, there is often a mismatch of expectations 
between givers and receivers, differing assumptions about the nature of the gift that are mixed up in a single social 
arena involving many givers, receivers and onlookers (for example, a governmental aid donor, a governmental aid 
recipient, and the citizens of both countries who observe the flow of aid and are positioned differently in relation to it). 
Harkening to Mauss’s admonition that ‘charity is … wounding’, could we then see the Russian government’s efforts 
to join the global community of donors at least partly as a defence mechanism against the demeaning experience of 
being treated as a perpetual recipient on the world stage, and an effort to be seen as a global player with prestige and 
influence? In order not to be categorized alongside Africans or Haitians, must one be seen to give to Africans and 
Haitians? 
Russian ‘citizens of the world’ 
My own anthropological field research in Russia was carried out at a time (the 1990s) when Russia was in the position 
of being an aid recipient, and in a location where the need for humanitarian assistance was genuinely quite acute 
(Chukotka, a region in the Russian Far North; see Gray 2005). My most intense and long-term periods of fieldwork 
happened to place me alongside residents of Russia (of various ethnicities) just as they were experiencing being 
targeted by both official development assistance and more informal charity from abroad, and in some ways I found 
myself implicated in the delivery of some of that aid and charity. The ambivalence of that positionality – both mine 
and that of my interlocutors – was deeply impressed upon me. 
These experiences also impressed upon me the importance of recognizing development aid as a cultural 
phenomenon, even though it is persistently couched in economic and political terms. The potential for aid to be used 
as a strategic foreign-policy tool is clear, but to reduce Russia’s moves toward donorship to the simple formulae of 
realist international-relations theory is to miss the point. The challenge is to examine the cultural assumptions that 
underlie Russia’s actions – as well as the cultural assumptions that underlie the international response to Russia’s 
posturing as an aid donor and distinctly not a recipient. Thus, while it is useful to think through the macro-level 
relations, it is equally if not more important to consider the micro level of Russians’ own experiential accounts. How 
might Russians approach development aid differently from the entrenched ‘development apparatus’, by which I mean, 
for example, the G8, the World Bank and its IDA (International Development Association), the OECD and its DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee), and the countries that acknowledge the authority of such global agencies? This 
apparatus has been constructed from within the Euro-American context as the only acceptable way to go about 
development (both the doing of it and the accounting for it), as if development were a common-sense and culture-free 
category. However, I would argue that it is a category heavily laden with shared cultural assumptions – assumptions 
not of the culture of any country or region or people, but of a bureaucratic culture of an imagined ‘West’, perhaps 
something of a transnational imagined community (pace Anderson 1983; cf. Gupta 1992).5 
What is shared here in this ‘development community’ are the bureaucratic practices of development, which I am 
arguing are cultural practices – techniques for accountability, the way projects are planned and funded, the faith in 
‘capacity building’ to reproduce accountable subjects, the emphasis on ‘deliverables’ and ‘reportables’ (cf. Gould 
2005). These have been naturalized to the extent that participants in this culture proceed as if utterly convinced there is 
no other possible way of doing development (even as they are constantly discussing what has been wrong with 
development in the past and exhibit a fervent belief that they are in the continual process of reforming and improving 
development practices). 
Certain countries are placed in a separate category – ‘new’ donors as opposed to ‘traditional’ donors – not primarily 
because they are new on the scene (usually they are not), but because they do not (yet) share the culture of this 
imagined transnational community. There are all kinds of ways that this difference is discursively marked, such as in 
the phrases ‘emerging donors’, ‘non-DAC donors’, or ‘new partners’. To the extent that donor countries in this other 
category do things differently, that they introduce new cultural practices of development into the global arena, they are 
held suspect and cause worry, which is also discursively marked in particular ways, for example, in the phrases 
‘reverse aid’ or ‘authoritarian aid’. As one article in The Economist put it, the spread of aid from these sorts of suspect 
donors is a challenge to ‘Western ideas of the right sort of giving’.6 The main worry articulated is that these donors 
will not be accountable and will therefore cause damage or harm in some way – or, as one think tank has put it, that 
they will ‘undermine democracy’.7 
Thus many observers fail to see Russia’s emergence as a donor as a cultural, or even economic, phenomenon, but 
see it rather as a political phenomenon, and a negative one at that. This is in spite of the fact that, if one observes 
closely, it becomes apparent that the Russian government – or more properly a subset of actors within the government 
– is bending over backwards to play by the rules of the ‘development club’, and working with global agencies to 
develop the technology and accounting infrastructure to make Russia’s aid donations transparent and accountable. For 
example, in May 2008 the Russian Ministry of Finance held a workshop, along with the World Bank, entitled 
‘Development aid statistics: International experience and the creation of a Russian accounting and reporting system’. 
The workshop’s sponsors included USAID, the OECD, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID).8 A recent Russian textbook on international development 
institutions – the first of its kind9 – argues forcefully that ‘Russia’s participation in the OECD and the DAC not only 
will facilitate raising the prestige and increasing the influence of the country in the international arena, but also will 
allow to a greater degree its integration into processes of global economics’ (Zaitsev et al. 2010: 207).10 
I have only recently begun to explore Russia’s emergence as a 
donor ethnographically, by spending time with participants in the 
extremely well-developed and sophisticated (Western hand-
wringing notwithstanding) Russian NGO sector, encountering 
volunteering organizations that are beginning to add an overseas 
dimension to their helping work. These are people in their 20s and 
30s who are just coming of age in terms of their international social 
and political awareness, the first Russians I have encountered who 
have described themselves not as Russian patriots, but as ‘citizens 
of the world’. They are socially active, either as contributing 
members of charity organizations or in having spent time as 
volunteers abroad, and they provide evidence of a blossoming 
informal volunteering movement in Russia (entirely independent of 
the Putin-inspired volunteer youth movement Nashi11). 
At the same time, some of the people I have spoken to express a 
certain incredulity about the idea of Russia as a donor of aid 
abroad. At first, the phenomenon was almost too new to be studied, 
and many of the people I encountered were surprised to hear that 
their government was setting itself up as an international aid 
donor.12 A common response was that there are still problems 
enough inside Russia that need to be addressed, so why would 
Russia be thinking about sending aid abroad? There is some discussion of these issues on Russian blogs and social-
networking sites, much of it sharply ironic about the ambiguities inherent in Russia taking the role of donor or helper 
in relation to ‘the Third World’. 
The relentless significance of Africa 
Fig. 6. At the Donors Forum conference, attendees browse the 
slick brochures of Russian NGOs. 
As I mentioned above, there are two rather separate conversations going on in 
development discourse: a primary one dealing with North-to-South vectors of aid, 
and a more recent and subsidiary one dealing with West-to-East vectors of aid. I am 
entering these conversations from a different perspective altogether: via Russia’s 
entry into the ‘development community’ as it steps out of the role of recipient and 
into the role of donor. And here is where I take a perhaps unexpected detour to 
Africa, because I would argue that it is by using Africa as a fulcrum that Russia 
attempts to lever itself out of the West-East axis as a transitioning recipient country 
and into the North-South axis as an emerging donor country. 
In what at first was only a very thin official development discourse coming out of 
Russia, I was surprised to see the extent to which Africa featured in the Russian 
government’s official press releases, which have appeared in both Russian and 
international media sources. In spite of the fact that Russia’s official overseas 
development activities are primarily targeted at the Newly Independent States, 
those in Central Asia in particular, statements of government spokesmen are more 
likely to make reference to Africa as a key recipient of Russia’s international 
largesse – for example, highlighting Russia’s contributions to the Millennium 
Development Goals, of which Africa is an iconic focus, or boasting of Russia’s 
intention to cancel African debt.13 They also mention the presence of African students in Russian higher-education 
institutions as an example of Russia’s aid to the developing world, usually pointing out that this dates from the Soviet 
period. 
Here I will state what I think is obvious, but which bears emphasizing at this point: the signifiers ‘North’ and 
‘South’ and ‘West’ and ‘East’ are category markers, and while the content of these categories remains persistently 
ambiguous, in usage there is an implication that what is signified is a matter of common sense between all 
interlocutors. One clear assumption in this usage is that the ‘North’ is already developed and does not need help, while 
the ‘South’ is undeveloped/underdeveloped/developing and needs ‘our’ help. Of significance here is the question of 
who controls the deployment of the discourse of development, such that who belongs to each category becomes 
seemingly obvious, and the jargon and practices (aka ‘best practices’) of the ruling global agencies come to seem 
natural and beyond reproach. The logical converse of this naturalization is that those who fail to employ the jargon 
and practices are in some way worthy of censure. 
It is in this sense that Russia’s emergence as a donor both challenges and affirms assumptions about the 
directionality of development aid: Russia challenges them by entering this arena as neither properly of the North nor 
properly of the South, and as such it is in a unique position to introduce innovative development discourse and 
practice. On the other hand, Russia affirms entrenched assumptions by the way it positions itself as a donor to ‘the 
Third World’, especially to ‘Africa’ writ large, and also by its near-wholesale adoption of the accepted jargon and 
practices – at least in most quarters of what remains a not-fully-formed Russian government aid apparatus. It appears 
that for all states aspiring to be leaders in the world and wishing to join an elite peer group of donors (and this 
category of aspirants includes China, which decidedly does not kowtow to accepted jargon and practices), Africa is the 
arena where they can demonstrate their power and privilege by rendering aid to those presumed to be perpetually 
powerless and underprivileged. Donors need recipients in order to be donors – in order to get to give – and Africa 
remains the world’s most iconic perpetual recipient. 
Conclusion 
Through both its domestic and foreign policies and practices, Russia seems to be resisting its recent subject placement 
in the global political economy, refusing to play the role of non-reciprocating aid recipient, and insisting on being 
taken as a legitimate player in the aid game. For Russia, it seems, incorporation into the global economy, and the 
continuation of its own development, necessitate its becoming a donor in the global system of givers and receivers. 
This takes me back to my emphasis on theories of the gift, and the idea of giving on a global scale: for states that are 
vying for position in a global arena, it is crucial to openly demonstrate one’s global ‘goodness’ and generosity. If there 
are ideas about the right sort and the wrong sort of giving, then Russia seems to be setting about earnestly to 
demonstrate that it rightfully deserves to be one of those who gets to give. l 
Fig. 5. Soviet two-kopek stamp depicting 
Patrice Lumumba, first prime minister of the 
Republic of Congo. The Soviet Union’s 
Peoples’ Friendship University, whose 
purpose was to educate students from the 
Third World, was named after Lumumba. 
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Research underlying this article was funded by the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) and 
was greatly facilitated by research coordinator Tatiana Vagramenko and research assistants Dmitry Arzyutov, Anna Cherepanova, 
Anastasia Gulyavena and Katya Kapustina. I have benefited from comments from Julie Hemment, Steven Sampson, Elizabeth 
Dunn, Bengt Karlsson and Chandana Mathur, and am grateful to three anonymous readers who gave encouraging feedback and 
offered helpful suggestions. I accept full responsibility for any errors of fact or judgement that remain in the text. 
1. English translation available as ‘Russia’s participation in international development assistance: Concept’. Direct link to pdf: 
http://www.minfin.ru/common/img/uploaded/library/2007/06/concept_eng.pdf (last accessed January 2011). 
2. By comparison, in 2008 the US spent $26,842 million, the UK spent $11,500 million and Ireland spent $1,328 million. 
Sources: OECD 2010, ‘Beyond the DAC: The welcome role of other providers of development co-operation’, available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/opendoors (accessed January 2011); and OECD 2010, ‘Development aid: Net official development 
assistance’, table available online at http://www.oecd.org in the statistics section of the website (accessed January 2011). 
3. By comparison, in 2010 the US spent more than $4,450 million, the UK spent more than $568 million and Ireland spent more 
than $89 million. Source: Financial Tracking Service, http://fts.unocha.org, ‘Make a custom table’ section of website (accessed 
January 2011). 
4. Antonov, S. 2006. Bezvozmezdno – ne znachit ne vygodno (Free does not mean unprofitable). Parlamentskaia gazeta no. 
195 (2045), 22 November (the online version of this issue has unfortunately been removed from the newspaper’s website). 
Translation from the Russian by the author. 
5. Thanks to Steven Sampson for pointing out that it is also a transnational actual community, since jet-setting development 
professionals see enough of one another to form long-term face-to-face relationships. 
6. Development aid from authoritarian regimes: An (iron) fistful of help. The Economist 6 June 2009, p. 57. 
7. Freedom House, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Asia 2009. Undermining democracy: 21st-century authoritarians. 
In this report, Russia is lumped together with China, Iran, Pakistan and Venezuela as one of ‘five influential countries [that] are 
impeding democratic development both within and beyond their border[s] … By doling out billions of dollars in no-strings-
attached foreign aid, these regimes are hobbling international efforts to improve governance and reduce corruption.’ See the 
Executive Summary at http://www.underminingdemocracy.org/execSummary.php (last accessed January 2011).  
8. Interestingly, the UK had already suspended its programme of foreign aid to Russia in March 2007, and DFID’s website was 
changed to make a bold statement that it was time for Russia to become a donor in its own right. However, the UK has not entirely 
suspended its programme, since UK aid to Russia continues, but has shifted to take the form of helping Russia to build up its own 
aid programmes. See the DFID website at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/where-we-work/europe/russian-federation/ (last accessed 
January 2011). 
9. Since late 2008, I have been trawling the internet for evidence of such books, and in October 2009, I exhaustively searched 
the major bookstore Dom Knigi in both Moscow and St Petersburg; store staff working the politics and economics section of the 
Moscow store made a valiant attempt to locate any related books, but ultimately responded with shrugged shoulders.  
10. Translation from the Russian by the author. 
11. Nashi (‘Ours’) is a pro-Putin, Kremlin-backed youth movement, founded in 2005. Its full name is ‘Youth Democratic Anti-
Fascist Movement, Nashi.’ See Belov 2008, Hemment 2009. 
12. The first forum on involving Russian NGOs in international development assistance took place only in June 2010, 
sponsored by the Open Forum for CSO Effectiveness. In their report of the event, the Russian organizers write that ‘the majority 
of CSOs [civil-society organizations] in Russia still underestimate the importance of IDA [international development aid]’. One of 
the main points of discussion at the forum was the aim of ‘promot[ing] a reputation of Russia as a “good door”’. Report (in 
English) available online: http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/-open-forum-national-consultations,049-.html (last accessed January 
2011). 
13. See for example the statement of one of Russia’s deputy finance ministers, Sergei Storchak, at the 23 October 2007 session 
of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, in which he states: ‘It is obvious that new and traditional donors should 
join in a common programme to reach the Millennium Development Goals’ (translation from Russian by the author). Posted on 
Russia’s pages of the United Nations website: 
http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRootrus/Statements/ga/ga_docs/Statement231007ru.htm (last accessed January 2011). See also 
the RIA Novosti news item from 20 October 2007 about a press conference of Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin in Washington, 
DC, ‘Rossiia vneset $20 mln v fond borvy s maliariei v stranakh Afriki’ (Russia will pay $20 million into the fund for the fight 
against malaria in the countries of Africa), posted on the Ministry of Finance website: 
http://minfin.ru/ru/press/speech/index.php?afrom4=20.10.2007&ato4=20.10.2007&id4=1017 (last accessed January 2011).  
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